Crisis Analysis Team – DR Congo: Monthly Displacement Report, September 2023 – Democratic Republic of the Congo

Overview of humanitarian access

In Ituri, security news in September was marked by the announcement of the extension of joint UPDF-FARDC operations against the ADF in the Mambasa territory. While these operations should, in the long term, reduce the ADF’s level of nuisance and contribute to a lasting improvement in humanitarian access in Mambasa, they do raise concerns about the immediate effects, which could push the ADF to move towards currently stable areas, notably on Route Nationale 4 (RN4) and in the Okapi Wildlife Reserve (RFO). In addition, CODECO-URDPC have maintained their activism in Djugu territory, carrying out attacks against civilian populations for reasons of economic predation. These fighters take advantage of the dilapidated state of the roads in this territory to ambush and extort the trading population.
Meanwhile, in September, the candidacies of two former Hema warlords for the national legislature were rejected by the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI). Given their notoriety in this community, it is possible that they are instrumentalizing certain members of pro-Hema armed groups, notably Zaïre, to increase their activism and then take advantage of this situation to create a place for themselves in the national or provincial political arena.
In North Kivu in September, the M23 maintained its activism by clashing with local armed groups in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories. Although there has been no fighting between the M23 and the FARDC for several months, the Congolese government issued an ultimatum, which expired on September 24 without being respected, again demanding the M23’s withdrawal from the areas it occupies.

This ultimatum raised the risk of an imminent resumption of hostilities between these two armed actors. Since then, the M23 has strengthened its presence in several towns in these territories, demonstrating its determination to resist pressure from the Congolese government. The DRC government, for electoral reasons, may soon set out to restore its authority in the territories controlled by the M23, resorting to the military option in the absence of convincing results from the diplomatic and political strategies used to date. In Beni territory, the ADF remained active in September, provoking attacks on both civilians and the FARDC in the Ruwenzori sector, which restricted humanitarian access in the Batangi Mbau and Bolema groups.

In South Kivu, the humanitarian access dynamic remains similar to that of August, characterized by severe constraints in the Uvira-Fizi-Mwenga highlands. The leadership conflicts reported within the various armed groups are at the root of incidents with a high impact on humanitarian access. In Fizi territory, these leadership conflicts oppose two FDLR commanders (Amanda and Bonnet) on the one hand, and two Mai-mai factions (Yakutumba and Biloze Bishambuke) on the other. These rivalries, which contribute to the multiplicity of armed groups, are keeping the Lulenge and Nganja area in a security stalemate. September was also marked by targeted assassinations of Banyamulenge community leaders by Gumino-Twirwaneho fighters. These assassinations are intended to discourage community leaders who express their willingness to participate in the peace process with members of other local communities. The Gumino fighters see this process as unfavourable, as it should ultimately limit their hold on the areas and resources they control. On the other hand, a relative lull has been noted on the RN5 in the Ruzizi plain, following the repositioning on this road, in September, of elements of the Burundi National Defense Force (FDNB).
In Maniema, the overall situation in September was characterized by low humanitarian access constraints and the absence of armed clashes. Activism by the Malaika Mai-mai, particularly the Kabala faction, remained focused on acts of urban crime, including extortion and ambushes against civilians.
In Tanganyika, the security situation was also characterized by low levels of humanitarian access. In particular, unlike August, there were no clashes in September between armed members of the Twa community and the Bantou self-defence group. However, members of the Twa community carried out acts of extortion and ambushes against civilian populations, particularly in the Kalemie territory.